Job v Jones; State of NSW (Fire and Rescue NSW) v Jones [2026] NSWDC 221
Key takeaways
- Section 3A(2) of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) (MAC Act)[1] only excludes injuries that arise gradually through a series of incidents and those that cannot be measurably associated with a single motor accident occurring at a fixed point in time.
- A motor accident can still fall within the MAC Act where it causes a measurable aggravation, exacerbation or relapse of a pre-existing psychological injury, which is a common issue in claims involving emergency workers and first responders. The existence of prior trauma or even multiple prior traumatic events does not automatically remove a claim from the CTP scheme.
- Section 3A(2) broadly excludes progressive ‘nature and conditions of work’ injuries, such as cumulative trauma cases, rather than identifiable injuries caused by a motor accident.
Background
In the course of his employment as a firefighter with Fire and Rescue NSW, Russell Job attended a fatal bus collision in October 2011. During the rescue he was exposed to traumatic events, including extracting a critically injured teenage passenger who later died. Mr Job subsequently developed post-traumatic stress disorder, ceased operational duties in 2019 and was medically discharged in 2022. Fire and Rescue NSW paid substantial workers compensation benefits for his loss of earnings and treatment.
Two proceedings in this matter were heard together by the District Court. Mr Job made a common law damages claim against the insured negligent driver and owner of the bus coach pursuant to the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) (MAC Act). Separately, the State of New South Wales (Fire and Rescue NSW) commenced proceedings under section 151Z(1)(d) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) seeking recovery of the workers compensation payments it had made to Mr Job from the driver and owner of the coach.
Liability for negligence was admitted. However, the Defendants in the CTP claim proceedings contended that section 3A(2) of the MAC Act excluded the operation of the CTP scheme because Mr Job’s psychiatric injury had arisen gradually from the accumulation of multiple traumatic incidents occurring throughout his firefighting career, rather than from the 2011 motor accident alone.
Issues
The Court was asked to determine, as a separate question, the proper construction of section 3A(2) of the MAC Act, and specifically the meaning of the expression “an injury that arises gradually from a series of incidents.”
The principal issue was whether section 3A(2):
- excludes any claim where a motor accident forms part of multiple traumatic events contributing to an injury, or
- is confined to cumulative or progressive injuries that cannot be attributed to an identifiable motor accident occurring at a fixed point in time.
Decision
Abadee DCJ rejected the Defendants’ broad interpretation that section 3A(2) excludes any injury where multiple traumatic events have contributed to the Claimant’s psychological condition.
His Honour held that the provision must be construed in the context of the MAC Act as a whole, including its legislative history and prior authorities concerning the distinction between injuries caused by identifiable motor accidents and injuries arising from the ongoing nature and conditions of employment.
His Honour relied on earlier authorities, including Hooker v Gilling, Leo N Dunn & Sons Pty Ltd v McPhillamy, Emad Trolley Pty Ltd v Shigar, Owen v New South Wales and Khaya v Container Terminals Australia Ltd, in support of a finding that section 3A(2) merely clarified the existing law, rather than expanding the scope of exclusions from CTP coverage. On this basis, progressive ‘wear and tear’ injuries remained outside the scheme, whereas identifiable injuries caused by a motor accident remained within it.
Consistent with this view, the Court observed that section 3A establishes a clear dichotomy. Section 3A(1) applies where an injury is caused by a motor accident occurring at a fixed point in time. By contrast, section 3A(2) applies where the injury develops gradually through multiple incidents and cannot be associated with any specific accident/incident. His Honour explained:
“Section 3A(2) is engaged where it cannot be proven that a singular motor vehicle accident has caused the development, aggravation or exacerbation of psychological or psychiatric injury. Instead, the…injury is the result only of the (gradual) accumulation of multiple events that have occurred over a period of time.”
Importantly, the Court recognised, at [68], that an aggravation or exacerbation of a pre-existing psychiatric condition may still constitute a compensable injury under the MAC Act provided it is measurable and attributable to a specific motor accident. On this point, His Honour stated:
“There is no reason why, so long as the other conditions in s 3A(1) are satisfied, the MAC scheme could not apply to a victim who sustains an aggravation or exacerbation of a pre-existing psychological or psychiatric injury, or a relapse any less than it could apply to a victim who has had no pre-existing psychological or psychiatric injury. Conceivably, all these types of injury are measurable in impact.” (emphasis added)
The Court therefore held that section 3A(2) excludes only those injuries that arise gradually through multiple incidents and cannot be measurably associated with a single motor accident occurring at a fixed point in time.
Having determined the proper construction of section 3A(2), the Court left it to the parties to reach agreement about the implications of that finding for the claims in dispute.
Why this decision is important
This decision provides welcome clarity on the proper construction of section 3A(2) and its equivalent in the Motor Accidents Injuries Act 2017 (section 1.9(2)). The issue has been particularly significant in claims for damages and section 151Z recoveries involving psychiatric injuries sustained by first responders.
Although some questions may remain about what constitutes an injury that can be ‘measurably identified’, the Court has provided helpful guidance by observing that psychological injuries, including aggravations, exacerbations and relapses of pre-existing conditions, are conceivably measurable in impact.
The decision reinforces that the focus under section 3A(2) is whether the injury can be measurably linked to an identifiable motor accident, rather than whether the claimant has experienced other traumatic events throughout their life or career.
This article was written by Alexandra Christopoulos and Andrew Gorman. For further information or advice on any related matters please contact Andrew.
Disclaimer: This information is current as of July 2026. This article does not constitute legal advice and does not give rise to any solicitor/client relationship between Meridian Lawyers and the reader. Professional legal advice should be sought before acting or relying upon the content of this article.
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