Home | Defining the boundaries of a motor accident

INSIGHTS: Defining the boundaries of a motor accident

August 27, 2025

Author

Principal Andrew Gorman
Andrew Gorman
Principal

Allianz Australia Insurance Limited v Bell [2025] NSWCA 187


Key takeaways

  • A medical Review Panel constituted under the Motor Accidents Injuries Act 2017 is not a court or tribunal and has no role in determining legal issues such as the scope of a motor accident.
  • When there are multiple elements to an incident (e.g. theft, collision, and resulting fear), there is no mandate to treat each separately. Subject to circumstances such as timing, they may be considered a single causative event for the purposes of impairment assessment.


Background

The claimant was injured while running towards a thief who was wheeling away the claimant’s Harley-Davidson (having been unable to start the motor). The motorcycle was pushed into him, causing a leg injury. A second rider picked up the thief and turned towards the claimant as if to drive at him. The claimant made a claim for personal injury benefits under the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (NSW) (“MAIA”) for his leg injury and a psychological injury.

The CTP insurer, Allianz, argued that the psychological injuries were caused by theft and fear of retribution, which were distinct from the motor accident and therefore not compensable.

A dispute concerning whole person impairment of the psychological injuries was referred for medical assessment by the Personal Injury Commission of New South Wales (“PIC”), where the assessor determined that none of the psychological injuries were related to the motor accident. The claimant’s review application was dismissed.

The claimant commenced judicial review proceedings. The decision was set aside, and the issue was remitted to the PIC for redetermination. On remittal, the PIC concluded that the claimant’s psychological injuries were caused by the motor accident, entitling him to statutory benefits and damages for non-economic loss.

The insurer sought judicial review of that outcome, but Lonergan J dismissed its five grounds of review. Allianz appealed to the Court of Appeal, relying again on the same grounds.


Issues

The insurer argued, among other things, that the judge erred in finding that the Review Panel fulfilled its statutory function in assessing causation.

The insurer submitted that the following were not part of the motor accident:

  • stealing the bike, and
  • the fear that followed because of the perception that the person who had stolen the bike, and the person who had picked up the thief, “were part of an outlaw bikie gang, and there would be retribution for reporting it to police”.

Allianz argued that the Review Panel had effectively bundled them into the description of the motor accident. In doing so, the Review Panel did not explain which specific event or events caused the claimant’s psychological injury.

Additionally, the insurer submitted that the Review Panel erred by not determining whether the events that caused the psychological injury happened before or after the motor accident. The insurer contended that these events could be considered a novus actus interveniens (a new intervening act) that could potentially break the chain of causation.

The claimant submitted that:

  • the Review Panel made findings about causation by reference to the physical events that occurred
  • the Review Panel correctly left it to the court or PIC to determine whether or not the events constituted a motor accident, and
  • the primary judge was correct in concluding that the Review Panel considered the motor accident as a “single causative event”, and that its findings disclosed no error in rejecting Allianz’s submissions.


Decision

In rejecting the insurer’s arguments, the Court of Appeal observed that there will be cases where a Review Panel is unable to attribute the cause of an injury to a particular physical event or events. This may be so when there are a combination of events that occur rapidly and a person suffers a psychological injury.

In the present case, the CCTV footage revealed how quickly the events surrounding the attempted theft of the claimant’s motorcycle took place. The Court concluded that it was “hardly surprising” that the Review Panel did not determine that the act of pushing the motorcycle towards the claimant by the thief so that it fell on him, with the foot peg causing a flesh wound, had no role to play in causing a psychological injury.

The Court held that the Review Panel was entitled to consider all the events in combination and determine that those events caused the psychological injury. There was no obligation to separate each element or make a determination of causation for each element. The collision of the motorcycle with the claimant’s leg did not have to be the sole cause of his psychological injuries “as long as it is a contributing cause which is more than negligible”, as per cl 6.7 of the Motor Accident Guidelines.

Addressing the insurer’s novus actus argument, the Court held that the primary judge correctly rejected this submission as misconceived, because it was “underpinned by an assertion that the [Review Panel] should have, (impermissibly), determined what constituted a motor accident”. It found that the Review Panel is not a court and no part of its function was to adjudicate the dispute by determining the scope of the motor accident. The Review Panel’s role was to determine a “quintessentially factual issue”, being the extent of the claimant’s Whole Person Impairment caused by the injury.

The majority upheld the primary judge’s decision, dismissing the appeal, with the insurer ordered to pay costs.


Why the decision is important

This decision highlights the fact that a Review Panel is not a court or tribunal and has no role in determining legal issues such as the scope of a motor accident.

The Court of Appeal was not required to determine whether the various elements of the incident amounted, at law, to a single causation event for which the insurer was wholly liable. However, it noted that in this case there was a direct association between a physical act involving a motor vehicle and the potential for psychological injury. The Court’s reference to the proximity of events offers guidance on factors relevant to the novus actus interveniens defence, while reaffirming that the defence is never a medical determination.

Further information

This article was written by Graduate, Alma Garibovic and reviewed by Principal Andrew Gorman. Please contact Andrew if you have any questions or would like more information.

Disclaimer: This information is current as of August 2025. This article does not constitute legal advice and does not give rise to any solicitor/client relationship between Meridian Lawyers and the reader. Professional legal advice should be sought before acting or relying upon the content of this article.
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