Home | When the IME Gives No Figure: ACT Supreme Court Clarifies WPI Reports and ACAT’s Power on Remittal

INSIGHTS: When the IME Gives No Figure: ACT Supreme Court Clarifies WPI Reports and ACAT’s Power on Remittal

November 18, 2026

Author

Senior Associate Jesse Iliopoulos
Jesse Iliopoulos
Special Counsel

AAI Ltd v Hernandez [2026] ACTSC 429


Key Takeaways

  • An independent medical examiner’s (IME) report must state a whole person impairment (WPI) assessment – Under section 144 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2019 (ACT) (MAI Act), a WPI report must state the examiner’s assessment of the injured person’s WPI. A report in which the IME says they are unable to provide a WPI assessment is not a WPI report.
  • ‘No rateable impairment’ does not necessarily mean 0% – The IME had said she was unable to assess WPI and later stated that there was ‘no rateable impairment’. In that context, the comment did not constitute a WPI assessment and the insurer could not treat it as an assessment of 0%.
  • No direction to adopt the private examiner’s figure – Under section 197 of the MAI Act, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT) may remit a decision to the insurer with directions designed to correct an error, such as obtaining a compliant WPI report. However, it was beyond ACAT’s statutory power to direct the insurer to base its final offer on the WPI assessed by the private examiner. The amount of the final offer remains for the insurer to determine, subject to any statutory minimum.
  • The final offer remains within the insurer’s discretion – Subject to the statutory minimum imposed by section 160 of the MAI Act, the insurer determines the amount of the final offer. It is not limited to choosing between the IME’s assessment and the private examiner’s assessment.
  • Offers without a WPI report remain an open question – The Court left open the question of whether an insurer can make a WPI offer or final offer where there is no compliant WPI report.


Background

Mr Hernandez was injured in a motor vehicle accident on 26 April 2022. AAI Ltd, trading as GIO, insured the vehicle that struck him and arranged for him to be assessed by IME, Dr Jan Tomlinson. She examined him on 7 February 2024. He had undergone right shoulder surgery after the accident, and displayed no active movement of the shoulder during the examination. Dr Tomlinson considered that the examination findings were excessive when compared with his reported symptoms and imaging. She believed he had developed a pain condition.

As she was unable to determine his range of motion reliably, Dr Tomlinson said she could not provide a WPI assessment.

Following a further MRI, Dr Tomlinson prepared a supplementary report without re-examining Mr Hernandez. She diagnosed rotator cuff tendinopathy and a pain condition, with organic pathology making only a minor contribution to his presentation. She again said she could not provide a WPI assessment.

When GIO asked whether she could assign a WPI, even if it was 0%, she replied that there was ‘no rateable impairment’ for a shoulder injury. GIO then told Mr Hernandez he was not entitled to quality of life benefits.

Mr Hernandez obtained a second assessment from a private medical examiner, Dr Mark Ridhalgh, who recorded a significantly greater range of motion and assessed 12% WPI.

GIO provided Dr Ridhalgh’s report to Dr Tomlinson. She disagreed with his assessment and maintained her view that there was ‘no rateable impairment’, based on Mr Hernandez’s presentation when she examined him in February 2024.

On 3 September 2024, GIO made a final offer based on a WPI of 0%. Mr Hernandez applied to ACAT for review, and Dr Ridhalgh later revised his assessment to 11% WPI.

The statutory framework

Entitlement to quality of life benefits under the MAI Act depends on the injured person’s WPI. A WPI of at least 5% gives rise to an entitlement to quality of life benefits, while a WPI of at least 10% is one of the gateways to an award of common law damages.

Where the insurer considers the injured person is likely to have a permanent impairment, it refers them to an authorised IME provider. The provider arranges for an IME to carry out the first WPI assessment.

An injured person who disagrees with that assessment may obtain a second assessment from a private medical examiner. The insurer may ask the IME to review the private examiner’s report and, whether or not it does so, the insurer must determine a final offer WPI. That decision is reviewable by ACAT.


The ACAT decision

In Hernandez v AAI Ltd (t/as GIO) [2025] ACAT 45, ACAT set aside GIO’s final offer based on 0% WPI. GIO appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, giving rise to the present decision.

ACAT found that GIO had treated Dr Tomlinson’s refusal to assign a WPI as an assessment of 0%, when the evidence as a whole did not support that conclusion. It also found that GIO’s final offer letter gave no reasons for preferring Dr Tomlinson’s reports. This was contrary to the insurer’s duty under section 20(4)(d) of the MAI Act to give written reasons for decisions having a material effect on an entitlement to defined benefits.

ACAT considered that once Dr Ridhalgh’s report showed a significantly greater range of shoulder motion and provided a WPI assessment, GIO had two options: accept the higher WPI assessment, or send Mr Hernandez for further testing with Dr Tomlinson or another IME. Rather than leaving that decision to GIO, ACAT effectively stood in the insurer’s shoes. It remitted the matter with a direction that GIO make a revised final offer based on a WPI of 11%.


The appeal

GIO appealed. At its request, ACAT referred a question of law to the Supreme Court under section 84 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008: whether, on a proper construction of Parts 2.6 and 2.10 of the MAI Act, ACAT had erred by directing GIO to make a revised final offer WPI in accordance with Dr Ridhalgh’s assessment. GIO did not challenge ACAT’s finding that its final offer based on 0% WPI was affected by error.

GIO’s challenge was confined to ACAT’s direction fixing the WPI at 11%. GIO argued that, first, the direction was beyond ACAT’s power and, second, ACAT had failed to provide adequate reasons for making the direction.


The Court’s analysis

First ground: ACAT’s direction fixing the WPI

Dr Tomlinson’s reports were not WPI reports

Section 144 of the MAI Act defines a WPI report as a report that, among other requirements, states the examiner’s assessment of the injured person’s WPI. The Court held that none of Dr Tomlinson’s reports met that definition. Her first two reports expressly stated she could not provide a WPI assessment.

GIO’s interpretation of her statement that there was ‘no rateable impairment’ as an assessment of 0% WPI was inconsistent with her earlier diagnosis of rotator cuff tendinopathy and her finding that organic pathology made a minor contribution to Mr Hernandez’s condition.

Dr Tomlinson had never expressly assessed Mr Hernandez’s WPI at 0%. Her review report reiterated her view that his range of motion, which was necessary to assess his upper limb impairment, could not be determined reliably. In that context, her statement that there was ‘no rateable impairment’ could not be regarded as an assessment of 0% WPI.

Although GIO had referred Mr Hernandez for a WPI assessment under section 138 of the MAI Act, Dr Tomlinson had not ultimately produced a WPI report.

ACAT’s direction did not subvert the IME’s role

GIO relied on Stewart v Kirk [2026] ACTSC 33. In that case, McCallum CJ held that a private medical examiner’s assessment of 10% WPI or more does not satisfy the WPI threshold for common law damages. Her Honour observed that the statutory scheme contemplates the final WPI assessment being provided by the IME first appointed.

GIO argued that ACAT’s direction requiring it to adopt Dr Ridhalgh’s assessment undermined the primacy given to the IME’s assessment under the statutory scheme. It submitted that the matter should have been remitted so that Dr Tomlinson could provide an assessment.

The Court rejected that argument on the facts. ACAT’s direction could not subvert the IME’s assessment, because no such assessment had been made.

The direction fixing the WPI was beyond ACAT’s power

The Court nonetheless held that ACAT’s direction was beyond its statutory power.

Section 197 of the MAI Act permits ACAT to set aside a decision and remit it to the insurer ‘in accordance with any direction of the ACAT’. However, that power must be understood in the context of ACAT’s role on external review. ACAT’s role is to determine whether the insurer’s decision was affected by an error of law or fact, rather than to reconsider the merits of the insurer’s decision.

A direction may be needed to clarify the steps required to correct a legal error or a fault in the fact-finding process, and ACAT had legitimately identified both. However, directing the quantum of the final offer went beyond ACAT’s review power. The Court said that an appropriate direction may have required GIO to procure a WPI assessment and, in turn, a compliant WPI report.

The Court emphasised that the final offer involves an inherent discretion as to quantum. The only limit is the minimum in section 160: the offer cannot be less than the IME’s assessment in the first WPI report or on review, whichever is greater. The insurer’s choice is not binary. ACAT’s view that it would have exercised the discretion differently was not a proper basis to interfere with it, and the direction fettered that discretion.

The Court also left open the question of whether an insurer can make a WPI offer or final offer where the IME has not produced a compliant WPI report.

The Court’s decision was confined to ACAT’s power to issue directions when remitting a matter to the insurer. It did not consider ACAT’s separate powers under section 197 to amend a decision or substitute a new decision. The case was also decided in circumstances where there was no compliant WPI report and, consequently, no minimum WPI figure applying under section 160.

Second ground: adequacy of ACAT’s reasons

GIO’s second ground was that ACAT had not explained why it chose to direct the insurer to adopt an assessment of 11% WPI rather than simply remitting the matter for reconsideration. The Court said it would not have succeeded in any event. ACAT had plainly chosen to stand in the insurer’s shoes and make the final offer decision itself. The problem was that approach, not an absence of reasons.


Outcome

The Court answered the referred question in GIO’s favour and will hear the parties on costs. The judgment does not address the further conduct of GIO’s appeal from ACAT’s decision.


Practical implications

The decision provides important guidance for insurers on both WPI assessments and the scope of ACAT’s powers on review. GIO succeeded on the question referred to the Court, which found that ACAT could not direct GIO to adopt the private examiner’s assessment of 11% WPI. However, the Court did not disturb ACAT’s decision to set aside GIO’s final offer based on 0% WPI.

An IME’s refusal to assess WPI is not an assessment of 0%. A report in which the IME says they cannot assess WPI, or records ‘no rateable impairment’ without making a WPI assessment, is not a WPI report. Such a report cannot simply be treated as an assessment of 0% WPI. Where the IME does not give a figure, the safer course is to obtain a compliant WPI report through the IME provider before making an offer. The Court left open whether an insurer can make a WPI offer at all in the absence of a compliant report.

On remittal, the figure stays with the insurer. Where ACAT sets aside a final offer and sends the matter back to the insurer, its directions may address the steps needed to correct the error, such as obtaining a compliant WPI report. However, subject to any statutory minimum imposed by the MAI Act, the amount of the final offer remains a matter for the insurer to decide.

The final offer is not confined to either examiner’s figure. Subject to the minimum imposed by section 160 of the MAI Act, an insurer is not limited to choosing between the IME’s assessment and the private examiner’s assessment. The insurer retains discretion to determine the amount of the final offer above the applicable statutory minimum.

This article was written by Special Counsel Jesse Ilioupoulos. Please contact Jesse if you have any questions or would like more information.

Disclaimer: This information is current as of November 2026. This article does not constitute legal advice and does not give rise to any solicitor/client relationship between Meridian Lawyers and the reader. Professional legal advice should be sought before acting or relying upon the content of this article.
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